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FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: LIMITATIONS ON
SUCCESSIVE APPLICATIONS FROM THE SAME PRISONER
RiCHARD A. WLLA1mSON*
It is well established that principles of res judicata are inapplicable
to federal habeas corpus proceedings.' Justification for the reiusal to
apply that doctrine relates to the function the writ of habeas corpus 2 is
designed to perform: "Conventional notions of finality of litigation
have no place where life or liberty is at stake and infringement of
constitutional rights is alleged." 3 The Supreme Court, however, has
created an alternative method of achieving some degree of finality in
cases involving successive federal habeas applications by the same pris-
oner. Numerous lower federal court decisions utilizing the guidelines
announced in Sanders v. United States4 demonstrate that essentially the
same result is being achieved as would be the case under application
of principles of res judicata.5
The impact of federal habeas corpus litigation on the alleged need
for finality in the criminal process has been a source of controversy
for many years.6 Despite continuing criticism during the past two
B.B.A., Ohio University; J.D., Ohio State University. Associate Professor of Law,
The College of William and Mary.
1. See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963); Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101
(1942); Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U.S. 239 (1924); Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S.
224 (1924).
2. Habeas corpus will be used throughout this Article to refer to proceedings ini-
tiated by state prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970), as well as to motions to vacate
sentences filed by federal prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970). The two remedies
are identical in most respects. See notes 8 & 38 infra.
3. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963). Acknowledging that the common
law refusal to apply principles of res judicata to habeas proceedings may have been
based on the fact that habeas judgments were not appealable, the Court found it neces-
sary to justify its holding on this more fundamental ground. See also Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391, 423 (1963) ("[T]he familiar principle that res judicata is inapplicable
in habeas proceedings . . . is really but an instance of the larger principle that void
judgments may be collaterally impeached.").
4. 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
5. E.g., United States v. Lee, 446 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1971); Johnson v. Maryland, 283
F. Supp. 929 (D. Md. 1968), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Johnson v. Copinger,
420 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1969).
6. Compare Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. R~v. 441 (1963), with Freund, Remarks, in Symposium: Habeas
Corpus-Proposals for Reform, 9 UTAH L. REv. 18, 27 (1964). Federal habeas applica-
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decades, a majority of the Supreme Court has stood firm in providing
a mechanism for redetermination in federal court of questions of fact
or law involving all claims of infringement of constitutional rights in
criminal proceedings. When, however, a prisoner has once been
afforded the opportunity to assert his claims in a federal forum by use
of habeas corpus, the filing of further applications for relief adds a new
dimension to the controversy. The problem, which has two aspects,
may be stated as follows: Once a prisoner has made application for
habeas relief and has received an adverse decision on the merits of his
claim, under what circumstances, if any, should he be permitted there-
after to present either the identical claim or an additional claim not
raised in the first application? Each aspect of the problem implicates
a fundamental question concerning the administration of criminal jus-
tice. First, to what extent does our system of justice require a pro-
cedure whereby fact relitigation is possible whenever inadequacy or
incompleteness of a prior determination can be shown? Second, at
what point do the necessities of judicial economy demanding assertion
of all claims in a single action outweigh the desirability of permitting
a full and fair federal collateral determination of all constitutional
claims?
It is instructive, after a decade, to examine the impact of Sanders on
the treatment of successive federal habeas corpus applications. Follow-
ing a brief discussion of that case and of provisions of the Judicial Code
which bear upon the question of successive habeas applications, atten-
tion will be afforded the tendency of some lower courts to interpret
tions increased from 584 in 1949 to 12,088 in 1971. DIRCrOR OF T=E ADMINISRATiVE
OFC.E OF THE UNrrE STATES CouRTs, AmNUAL REPORT, Table 16 (1971).
7. In Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), the Court emphasized that all federal
constitutional questions are cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings brought
by state prisoners. The right of federal prisoners to raise all federal constitutional
questions in section 2255 proceedings, which theretofore had been in some doubt,
seemingly was settled by Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969). The con-
troversy concerning issues cognizable in section 2255 proceedings, however, has not
subsided, even among members of the Court. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 93 S. Ct.
2041 (1973), Mr. Justice Powell, joined by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Rehn-
quist, assailed the holdings of the Court permitting prisoners to attack collaterally
questions relating to use of. evidence allegedly obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment. Id. at 2059 (concurring opinion). Justice Powell would confine the scope
of federal habeas inquiry in such cases to whether the prisoner was provided a fair
opportunity to raise the question in state proceedings. Expressing a fundamental dis-
agreement with the Court's past decisions, he cited Sanders as an example of cases
which have tended to "depreciate the importance of the finality of prior judgments in
criminal cases." Id. at 2062-63.
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Sanders without regard to the fundamental nature and purpose of fed-
eral habeas corpus, namely, a procedure designed to assure a full and
fair federal determination of the legality of restraints on personal lib-
erty. In the context of habeas applications presenting additional claims
not raised in a prior application, it will be suggested that the guidelines
announced in Sanders be modified to give full recognition to the role
of counsel in most habeas proceedings, to the factors which motivate
prisoners seeldng habeas relief, and to the nature and function of the
concept of waiver as applied in cases involving successive habeas appli-
cations. The discussion will proceed on the assumption that the prin-
ciples involved are equally applicable to habeas applications filed by
state prisoners and to section 2255 motions filed by federal prisoners.8
THE SANDERS DECISION
In Sanders, successive motions under section 2255 were denied with-
out a hearing. A federal district judge based his first ruling on the
ground that no underlying facts were asserted in the motion to support
its conclusory allegations, noting in addition that the allegations were
conclusively refuted by facts in the files and records of the case.' The
petitioner did not appeal but eight months later filed a second motion
alleging specific facts not contained in the earlier motion.' 0 The dis-
trict court denied the second motion on the ground that the movant
offered no reason for his failure to include this matter in his initial
motion." The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
denial of the second motion, 2 noting that the applicant knew of the
facts alleged therein at the time the earlier motion was filed. It was
held that the district court had acted within its discretion in refusing
relief without a hearing because of the movant's inability to justify the
failure to assert the necessary facts in his previous motion.3
8. In considering successive motions filed by a federal prisoner under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 (1970), the Sanders Court held that the principles governing successive appli-
cations for relief, whether from state or federal prisoners, are the same. 373 U.S. at
14-15.
9. See 373 U.S. at 5.
10. The petitioner's first claim for relief included an allegation that the sentencing
court had "allowed the Appellant to be intimidated and coerced into intering [sic] a
plea without Counsel, and any knowledge of the charges lodged against the Appel-
lant." Id. In his second application, the petitioner alleged that at the time of his trial
and sentence, he was mentally incompetent as a result of narcotics administered to
him while awaiting trial. Id.
11. Id. at 6.
12. Sanders v. United States, 297 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1961), rev'd, 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
13. 297 F.2d at 736-37.
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The Supreme Court premised its review of the case upon the inap-
plicability of principles of res judicata to habeas corpus proceedings
and to section 2255 motions to vacate sentence, apparently viewing the
question as one of constitutional significance. In examining the then
statutory language relating to successive applications for relief, the
Court noted that congressional attempts to alter established principles
concerning the inapplicability of the doctrine would raise "serious con-
stitutional questions."14 Although reversing the denial of the second
motion in the case before it, the Court nevertheless ruled that under
certain conditions a federal district judge may, within his discretion,
refuse to entertain on the merits successive habeas applications.
According to the guidelines enunciated by the Court, a federal dis-
trict court may give controlling weight to the denial of a previous
application for habeas relief and thus refuse to entertain a second appli-
cation on the merits upon determining, first, that the same ground had
been presented in a prior application, second, that the prior determina-
tion adverse to the applicant was on the merits, and, third, that the
ends of justice would not be served by reaching the merits of the new
application.' It was noted that the "same ground" requirement refers
to "a sufficient legal basis for granting relief." ", Allegations raising
the same "ground" include those proved by different factual allegations
as well as those supported by different legal arguments.' 7 Uncertainty
14. 373 U.S. at 11-12. The basis of this position is U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, which
provides: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." The Court,
on numerous occasions, has taken the position that even though the Constitution does
not define the nature of the writ, it implicitly authorizes, if not compels, the federal
courts to accord the writ its full common law meaning. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372
US. 391, 406 (1963). Several Justices, including Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissent
in Sanders, have taken issue with this interpretation of the Constitution. See notes 26-27
infra & accompanying text. Compare Chaffee, The Most Important Human Right in
the Constitution, 32 B.U.L. REv. 143, 146 (1953), with Collings, Habeas Corput' for
Convicts-Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace?, 40 CAuIF. L. REv. 335, 344-45
(1952).
15. 373 U.S. at 15.
16. Id. at 16.
17. Id. As an example of a claim constituting the same ground for relief, the Court
suggested an allegation that a confession was involuntary because of psychological
coercion followed by an allegation that the confession was obtained by the use of a
physical coercion.
Although the Court's definition of "same grounds" may be sufficient for most cases,
potential difficulties are apparent from its application in Sanders. It would not be unrea-
sonable to argue that an allegation that the prisoner had been "intimidated and coerced"
into entering a guilty plea without counsel is simply a generalized statement of a more
[Vol. 15:265
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as to whether a subsequent application raises a different ground for
relief is to "be resolved in favor of the applicant." 18 Concerning the
question whether the prior application was adjudicated "on the merits,"
the Court stated that if that application raised factual issues, an adju-
dication "on the merits" must have entailed an evidentiary hearing,
unless the files and records "conclusively resolved" the issues adversely
to the applicant. 10
The opinion was notably vague regarding the factors to be con-
sidered in determining whether the "ends of justice" would be served
by a refusal to redetermine a claim for relief. It was indicated, how-
ever, that if factual issues are involved, an additional evidentiary hear-
ing should be granted if the prior hearing was not "full and fair" within
the criteria established in Townsend v. Saim. 20 On the other hand, if
purely legal questions are involved, an additional hearing may be
granted upon the showing of an intervening change in the law or "some
other justification" for having failed to raise the argument in the prior
application.-2 It was emphasized that the applicant carries the burden
of showing that the ends of justice would be served by reaching the
merits of the new application. 22
specific allegation that the prisoner was mentally incompetent at the time of trial and
sentence as a result of narcotics administered to him while in jail pending trial. The
Court, however, treated the allegation in the second application as raising an entirely newground for relief; thus, the scope of inquiry on remand was limited to the question of
whether the prisoner had abused the writ. Id. at 21.
18. Id. at 16.
19. Id. See Villarreal v. United States, 461 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1972); Wallace v. United
States, 457 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1972); Anderson v. Page, 454 F.2d 432 (10th Cir. 1972).
20. 372 U.S. 293, 312-18 (1963). See notes 70-817 infra & accompanying text.
21. 373 U.S. at 17. Most of the lower court decisions since Sanders have involved
successive applications raising questions of fact. But see Brooks v. United States, 457
F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1972); United States ex rel. Townsend v. Twomey, 452 F.2d 350(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 854 (1972). Because of the current Supreme Court
position with respect to the retroactivity of its decisions (see Desist v. United States,
394 U.S. 244 (1969)), the question of intervening changes in the law has seldom been
argued. Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Desist, criticized the majority opinion for
its failure to deal with the "quite different factors" which should govern the appli-
cation of retroactivity in habeas corpus cases. Id. at 256-69. See generally Haddad,
"Retroactivity Should Be Rethought": A Call for the End of the Linkletter Doctrine,
60 J. CRIm. L.C. & P.S. 417 (1969); Kitch, The Supreme Court's Code of Criminal
Procedure: 196S-1969 Edition, 1969 Sup. Cr. Rxv. 155, 183-202; Mishkin, Foreword,
The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, The Sut-
preme Court, 1964 Tern, 79 HARv. L. REv. 56 (1965); Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reli-
ability, and Due Process: A Reply to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. Cm. L. REv. 719 (1966).
22. 373 U.S. at 17. The significance of placing the burden of proof on the appli-
cant is discussed in the text accompanying notes 77-78 infra.
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The Court distinguished the problem of successive applications in-
volving questions not previously raised by a prisoner. Noting that the
habeas procedure might be abused if an applicant were permitted to
assert a claim which could have been raised in a previous application, the
Court stated that "if a prisoner deliberately withholds one of two
grounds for federal collateral relief at the time of filing his first appli-
cation, . . . he may be deemed to have waived his right to a hearing
on a second application presenting the withheld ground." 23 Fay v.
Noia24 and Townsend v. Sain2 were cited as establishing the principles
to govern the determination whether there has been a waiver.
In his dissent, 6 Mr. justice Harlan, although agreeing with the
majority that principles of res judicata are inapplicable in habeas pro-
ceedings, argued that some finality in criminal litigation must be
achieved. Particularly concerned with the treatment of the application
under consideration, justice Harlan objected to the apparent affirmative
tenor in which the majority opinion dealt with the question of suc-
cessive applications. The fundamental difference between the two
opinions, however, involved the issue whether a congressional attempt
to modify previous Court decisions by limiting the right to file succes-
sive habeas applications would be an unconstitutional suspension of
the writ.2
STATUTORY LIMITATIONS ON SUCCESsIVE APPLICATIONS
Congress on two occasions has attempted to deal with the problem
of successive habeas applications. The 1948 amendments to the Judi-
cial Code introduced a provision, codified in section 2244,2 which
addressed the question of successive habeas applications of state or
federal prisoners alleging claims for relief previously determined ad-
23. 373 U.S. at 18.
24. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
25. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
26. 373 U.S. at 23-32.
27. See note 14 supra & accompanying text.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1964), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a) (1970). The original
version of the section provided:
No circuit or district judge shall be required to entertain an application
for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of a person pur-
suant to a judgment of. a court of the United States, or of any State, if it
appears that the legality of such detention has been determined by a judge
or court of the United States on a prior application for a wvrit of habeas
corpus and the petition presents no new ground not theretofore presented
and determined, and the judge or court is satisfied that the ends of justice
will not be served by such inquiry.
[Vol. 15:265
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versely to them. The statute provided that a successive application
should be denied if no new grounds for relief were presented and if
the ends of justice would not be served by an additional inquiry. It
apparently did not purport to deal with the problem of successive
habeas applications involving new grounds for relief.29
In construirg the effect of this provision, the Sanders Court stressed
the limitations on legislative power in this area.30 Noting that Congress
had specifically rejected a provision which would have injected the
full measure of res judicata into habeas proceedings,3 ' the Court con-
strued the statute as simply codifying several previous Supreme Court
decisions dealing with the problem.32 In addition to stating that the
1948 amendments did not change the law as established by prior deci-
sions with respect to questions previously determined adversely to the
applicant, the Court asserted that the apparent absence of congressional
action on the issue of successive applications alleging new grounds for
relief left undisturbed the Court's previous decisions in cases involving
questions of alleged abuse of the writ.33
Also enacted in 1948, section 2255 provides the procedures to be
utilized in motions by federal prisoners to vacate sentences.34 The por-
tion of that section addressing successive applications 5 purports, on its
face, to be much broader in coverage than section 2244.36 In providing
only that a court shall not be required to entertain successive applica-
29. In Sanders, the Court interpreted the statute as "addressed only to the problem
of successive applications based on grounds previously heard and decided." 373 U.S.
at 12. Mr. Justice Harlan, however, asserted that legislative history indicated that the
"new ground" proscription referred to a ground that had not previously been "known."
Id. at 27 (dissenting opinion).
30. See note 14 supra & accompanying text.
31. See S. REP. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1947).
32. 373 U.S. at 11. See Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224 (1924) (prior denial of writ
may be given controlling weight and subsequent application dismissed if it alleges
identical claim for relief and first denial followed a full hearing on the merits).
33. 373 U.S. at 12. See Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948) (regardless of num-
ber of prior applications for relief, assertion of new grounds not previously heard is
not per se abuse of remedy since petitioner might have been justifiably ignorant of
facts or unaware of their legal significance); Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U.S.
239 (1924) (prior refusal to grant writ must be given controlling weight when, on
subsequent application, same ground is raised as was raised in first application but upon
which no proof was offered).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
35. The pertinent provision is as follows: "The sentencing court shall not be re-
quired to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the
same prisoner." Id.
36. The Court in Sanders so noted. 373 U.S. at 12.
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dons "for similar relief," section 2255 could be construed as covering
cases involving grounds previously determined, as well as petitions al-
leging new grounds. Moreover, as noted in Sanders,37 section 2255
could be interpreted as authorizing a court in its discretion to apply
principles of res judicata to successive habeas corpus applications. The
Court in Sanders, however, emphasized that despite the differences in
language between sections 2255 and 2244, they are to be construed
similarly and in a manner consistent with previous decisions of the
Court. 8
In its second venture into the area of successive habeas applications,
and in apparent response to growing concern over the increasing num-
ber of such applications,3 9 Congress in 1966 amended section 2244.
The amendments added a provision, now codified in section 2244(b),40
designed to deal with successive habeas applications from state prisoners.
The Judicial Conference of the United States, which sponsored the
37. Id. at 13.
38. Id. at 14. The Court's questionable interpretation of section 2255 was apparently
in response to practical as well as constitutional considerations. In United States v.
Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952), responding to an allegation that section 2255 was an
unconstitutional suspension of the writ, the Court interpreted the section as afford-
ing the same rights as the traditional writ of habeas corpus. It was noted in Sanders
that if section 2255 were interpreted as making the remedy "less swift and imperative
than federal habeas corpus, the gravest constitutional doubts would be engendered
." 373 U.S. at 14. As a practical justification for its interpretation, the Court
observed that under the terms of section 2255, habeas corpus remains available to
federal prisoners when the remedy given by that section proves "inadequate or in-
effective." If res judicata were applied to section 2255 motions, the remedy would
be "inadequate or ineffective," and the federal prisoner could resort to habeas corpus
under section 2244. Id. at 14-15.
39. See S. REP. No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1970), amending 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1964), provides:
When after an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a material factual issue,
or after a hearing on the merits of an issue of law, a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of. a State court has been denied by a court of
the United States or a justice or judge of the United States release from
custody or other remedy on an application for a writ of habeas corpus, a
subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of such person
need not be entertained by a court of the United States or a justice or
judge of the United States unless the application alleges and is predicated
on a factual or other ground not adjudicated on the hearing of the earlier
application for the writ, and unless the court, justice, or judge is satisfied
that the applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately withheld
the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the writ.
The 1966 amendments also added a provision dealing with, the effect of direct re-
view by the Supreme Court of issues subsequently raised in habeas proceedings. 28
U.S.C. § 2244(c) (1970). Another provision addresses the burden and standard of
proof in evidentiary hearings. Id. § 2254(d).
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amendments, was candid in its statement that the intent of the new
section 2244(b) was to introduce a "qualified application of the doc-
trine of res judicata" into habeas proceedings.4'
One of several problems created by the 1966 amendments stems from
the fact that the former version of section 2244, now codified in sec-
tion 2244(a), remains available as a source of relief for persons in cus-
tody pursuant to a judgment of a court of the United States and for
whom relief under section 2255 is "inadequate or ineffective." Since
section 2255 was left unchanged by the 1966 amendments, there are
now three different statutory standards dealing with the problem of
successive applications. Such a result is difficult to justify, particularly
in light of the Supreme Court's determination in Sanders that constitu-
tional problems would be posed by provision of different procedures
for state and federal prisoners.43
Another difficulty resulting from the 1966 amendments involves the
limitation of section 2244(b) to cases in which there has been an evi-
dentiary hearing on the merits of the material factual issue. It was
emphasized in Sanders that an issue could be considered adjudicated
on the merits even though the determination was based solely upon
the records and files of the case.44 The section 2244(b) hearing require-
ment would appear inconsistent not only with this statement in Sanders
but also with the congressional purpose underlying the 1966 amend-
ments, that is, to limit the number of successive habeas applications.
Finally, a question is raised by the absence in section 2244(b) of
the "ends of justice" element of the Sanders test.4a The omission of
this language is particularly significant in view of its retention in section
2244(a).4" Legislative history of the amendments provides little insight
into the reasons for the omission.47 The "ends of justice" aspect of
the Sanders test frequently is the most important factor to be consid-
ered by a court in determining whether to entertain a subsequent
application based on an issue previously determined. Indeed, this re-
41. S. REp. No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) (letter from Judge Orie L. Philips,
chairman of the Habeas Corpus Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, to Sen. Joseph D. Tydings, Sept. 4, 1966).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
43. See note 38 supra.
44. 373 U.S. at 16.
45. See notes 20-22 supra & accompanying text.
46. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a) (1970).
47. It has been suggested that the congressional purpose in excluding the phrase was
to discourage its use without an express limitation. See Developments in the Law-
Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. RENv 1038, 1152 (1970).
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quirement is essentially a restatement of the fundamental purpose of
habeas corpus. Perhaps in recognition of the deficiencies of section
2244(b), the lower federal courts uniformly have continued to follow
the guidelines set forth in Sanders.4 8
REDETERMINATION OF ISSUES PREVIOUSLY PRESENTED
Application of Sanders Guidelines
Strict adherence to the Sanders guidelines requires a federal district
judge to determine initially whether a prior petition by the applicant
alleging the same grounds for relief has been denied on the merits. Al-
though there appears to be little difficulty in determining when the
same grounds for relief have been asserted, 49 a question frequently pre-
sented is whether a prior dismissal without a hearing was based solely on
deficient pleading of the issues and thus was not "on the merits";5°
as noted by the Court in Sanders, when factual issues are presented
there can be no decision on the merits in the absence of an evidentiary
hearing, unless the records and files "conclusively" resolve the issues
adversely to the applicant. 1 The most difficulty with the Sanders
guidelines, however, has been in applying the "ends of justice" aspect
of that test."' The need for clarification of this element is well illus-
trated by the extraordinary case of Charles Townsend.
In United States ex rel. Townsend v. Twomey, 3 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit dealt with the apparent climax to a case
which was described as reaching "Jarndycian proportions." " The
state appealed from a judgment in the district court granting a writ of
habeas corpus on the ground that a confession used in Townsend's trial
was drug induced and, therefore, involuntary. In a previous habeas
application, Townsend had raised the same issue, and, following an
evidentiary hearing on the question, the district judge had held that
the confession was voluntary and not drug induced. A retrial had been
48. See, e.g., Boyden v. United States, 463 F.2d 229 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 912 (1973). United States ex rel. Townsend v. Twomey, 452 F.2d 350 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 854 (1972).
49. See notes 16-18 supra & accompanying text.
50. See Cancino v. Craven, 467 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1972); Villarreal v. United States,
461 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1972).
51. 373 U.S. at 16.
52. See notes 20-22 supra & accompanying text.
53. 452 F.2d 350 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 854 (1972).
54. Id. at 351. The history of the litigation involving Charles Townsend is presented
in Appendix A of the decision of the court of. appeals. 452 F.2d at 363-64.
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granted, nevertheless, because the "new evidence" developed at the
evidentiary hearing concerned the circumstances surrounding the extrac-
tion of the confession and was deemed by the district judge relevant
to the issue of the credibility of the confession. The Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit, however, had disagreed and reversed the district
court's grant of a writ on Townsend's first applicationY5 Moreover, even
though Townsend had not cross-appealed the district court's finding that
his confession was voluntary, the appellate court referred in passing to
and expressed its agreement with that finding."'
Townsend subsequently filed a second habeas application. The same
district judge, finding that the application had merit and that the "ends
of justice would be served" by holding a second evidentiary hearing
on the question of the voluntariness of Townsend's confession, con-
cluded, contrary to his earlier decision, that the confession was drug in-
duced and involuntary."' In granting the writ, the district judge stated
that "new and additional evidence" had been presented and that there
had been "advances and changes in the law" since the earlier applica-
tion."s Again the court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision to
grant a new evidentiary hearing."9 Interpreting Sanders as requiring a
showing of "different or new evidence" before a district judge could
legitimately exercise his discretion to consider a second application,60
the court held that the second application presented no such "new"
evidence.0'
The basic disagreement between the court of appeals and the district
judge related to the significance of testimony given by an expert witness
55. United States ex rel. Townsend v. Ogilvie, 334 F.2d 837 (7th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 984 (1965).
56. 334 F.2d at 842.
57. United States ex rel. Townsend v. Twomey, 322 F. Supp. 158, 173-74 (N.D. Ill.
1971), rev'd, 452 F.2d 350 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 854 (1972). Townsend's
second application also raised other claims for relief, including a challenge of the
constitutionality of the death penalty and of exclusion from the trial of jurors who
had conscientious or religious scruples against capital punishment. The district judge
accepted both contentions as additional bases for granting the writ. 322 F. Supp. at
178-79.
58. 322 F. Supp. at 174.
59. 452 F.2d 350 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 854 (1972). The appellate court,
however, did agree with the district court's finding that the jury selection procedure
was unconstitutional under the Supreme Court's decision in Witherspoon v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 510 (1968). This issue was held to present grounds for relief arising as a
result of intervening changes in the law since the disposition of Townsend's first
habeas petition. 452 F.2d at 363. See note 21 supra & accompanying text.
60. 452 F.2d at 355.
61. Id. at 356.
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who had not testified either at the trial or the first evidentiary hearing.
The appellate court noted that the testimony of this witness, concerning
the effect of certain drugs given to Townsend prior to his confession,
was similar to testimony given by a different expert at the first evidentiary
hearing. In comparing the testimony of the two experts, the court noted
that both witnesses had relied on the same underlying facts in forming
their opinions and concluded that the testimony was similar in all material
respects. 62 In addition, it was observed that the testimony offered at the
second evidentiary hearing was the same as the witness would have given
if called at the time of the trial or the first evidentiary hearingY Since
the only difference in evidence was the opinion of another expert witness
on unchanged facts, it was held that no "new" matter was presented
upon which a second evidentiary hearing could be justified. 4
The court relied heavily upon the decision of the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in United States ex rel. Schnitzler v. Follette.";
That court had reversed the granting of a writ on a prisoner's initial
petition, holding that the district judge incorrectly determined, following
an evidentiary hearing, that a search warrant which had led to seizure
of certain incriminating evidence introduced at trial was issued on an in-
sufficient showing of probable cause.6" Alleging no new facts, the de-
fendant had filed a second habeas application which merely requested
the district court to apply what was conceded to be an unchanged con-
stitutional standard to the same facts. The judge again sustained the ap-
plicant's claim and granted the writ.6 7 In reversing this decision, the
court of appeals held68 that the trial judge had abused his discretion in
entertaining the second habeas application, since, in the opinion of the
appellate tribunal, his only basis for granting relief was the belief that
his first decision was correct and should not have been reversed on ap-
peal. The court found it unnecessary to apply the Sanders guidelines,
holding that the question was merely one of the impact of stare decisis
on a federal district judge.
62. Id. at 357.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 406 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 926 (1969), rev'g 290 F. Supp.
359 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
66. United States ex rel. Schnitzler v. Follette, 379 F.2d 846 (2d Cir.), rev'g 267
F. Supp. 337 (SD.N.Y. 1967).
67. United States ex rel. Schnitzler v. Follette, 290 F. Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
rev'd, 406 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 926 (1969).
68. 406 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 926 (1969).
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In his dissent in United States ex rel. To'wnsend v. Twomey'" Judge
Kerner argued that Schnitzler was inapposite, since the Townsend court
had not decided the question of the voluntariness of the prisoner's con-
fession on the first appeal. In addition, Judge Kerner asserted that the
Sanders test should not be interpreted as requiring "new" evidence be-
fore a district judge may entertain a second habeas application on the
merits.
The Correct Focus of Inquiry Under Sanders
The history of the litigation in the case of Charles Townsend dramatic-
ally demonstrates the potential for misapplication of the Sanders guide-
lines. The difficulties encountered by the federal district judge in that
case stem directly from the portion of the Sanders guidelines providing
that grounds previously decided on the merits may be redetermined if
the "ends of justice" so require.
Although not purporting to limit the circumstances which would re-
quire a redetermination of factual issues, the Sanders Court specifically
tied the meaning of the "ends of justice" clause to situations in which,
according to the criteria enunciated in Townsend v. Sain,70 the first
hearing on the merits of the claim was not "full and fair." 7 ' There is
indeed sound justification for applying the principles of Townsend v.
Sain to cases involving successive habeas applications which raise issues
previously resolved on the merits. The underlying purpose of a federal
habeas corpus proceeding is not merely to provide an additional forum
in which a prisoner may assert that his constitutional rights have been
denied; rather, it is to ensure a continuing mechanism for determinations
that such rights have been afforded.7 2 In this light, the question presented
to a federal court when a prisoner files a second application should be
framed in terms not of whether a fact relitigation is necessary but of
whether there has been an adequate federal adjudication.7"
These principles are well illustrated in the context of an initial section
2255 motion requesting a redetermination of a factual issue which was
considered by a federal trial judge. In such case, the prisoner clearly has
had an opportunity to assert his constitutional claim in a federal forum;
69. 452 F.2d 350, 364-69 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 854 (1972).
70. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
71. 373 U.S. at 16-17.
72. See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 226 (1969).
73. See Thornton v. United States, 368 F.2d 822, 831 (D.C. Cr. 1966) (Wright, J.,
dissenting).
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consequently, the justification may seem less than compelling for per-
mitting a collateral redetermination of facts previously found adversely
to the applicant.74 It is clear, however, that section 2255 motions are not
per se improper in cases where the same issue has been presented at trial.
The decision to hold an evidentiary hearing on an initial section 2255
motion where the federal trial judge has had a "say" on the question
should be determined in accordance with the criteria outlined in Town-
send v. Sain75 since the issue is identical to that presented by a state
prisoner on his first habeas application,76 that is, whether there has been a
full and fair hearing on contested factual issues.
In all probability, the Court in Sanders intended that a subsequent
habeas application be examined in the same manner as an initial habeas
petition by a state prisoner or section 2255 motion by a federal prisoner.
There is, however, one difficulty concerning the equating by the Sanders
Court of the Townsend v. Sain "full and fair" hearing criteria with its
own requirement that the district judge make a finding whether the
"ends of justice" would be served by entertaining an additional applica-
tion. The placing on the applicant of the burden of showing that the
ends of justice would be served by a redetermination" introduces an
element not present in Townsend v. Sain, since nothing in that decision
74. Permitting federal courts to redetermine questions of law and fact previously de-
termined by state courts has been partially justified on the theory that due to the dif-
ferences in institutional setting within which federal judges operate, there is a sub-
stantial interest in having a federal forum adjudicate federal constitutional claims of
state prisoners. See Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Htav. L.
REv. 1038 (1970).
75. 372 U.S. 293 (1963). The Townsend Court held that in reviewing state court
proceedings a federal habeas court should order an evidentiary hearing if:
(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hear-
ing; (2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the
record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state
court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a
substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts
were not adequately developed at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any
reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas
applicant a full and fair fact hearing.
Id. at 313. It has been observed that "foif these, only the duty of the federal habeas
court to scrutinize 'the fact-finding procedure' . . . [of the trial court] does not apply
in the case of a federal prisoner; federal fact-finding procedures are by hypothesis
adequate to assure the integrity of the underlying constitutional rights." Kaufman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 217, 227 (1969).
76. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 227-28 (1969).
77. 373 U.S. at 17.
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indicates that the applicant must assume the burden of proving that the
state hearing was not full and fair.78
It is now possible to return to the case of Charles Townsend to ex-
amine the misapplication of the Sanders guidelines. The federal district
judge, after noting that the application raised a factual issue previously
decided adversely to the applicant, should have determined whether
there had been a full and fair hearing on the question. Since under Town-
send v. Sain the existence of newly discovered evidence is only one fac-
tor entering into this determination, 79 the court of appeals clearly was
incorrect in holding that there must be some "new" evidence before a
district judge can order a second evidentiary hearing. In addition, the
definition of "newly discovered evidence" in To'wzsend v. Sain is much
broader than that traditionally used by courts in ruling on motions to
grant a new trial, including therein any evidence which is crucial to an
adequate consideration of a constitutional claim and which, for some
reason other than inexcusable neglect, could not have been introduced at
a prior evidentiary hearing8s Assuming that the testimony of the second
expert witness was additional evidence crucial to an adequate determina-
tion of Townsend's constitutional claim, both the district judge and the
court of appeals should have explored further why such testimony was
not produced at trial or at the first evidentiary hearing, rather than merely
determining that the testimony was available at the time of trial and the
first evidentiary hearing.' It is submitted that these failures to apply the
principles of Townisend v. Saiti to the "ends of justice" requirement of
Sanders evidence a misapplication of the Sanders guidelines and a disre-
gard of the fundamental nature and purpose of federal habeas corpus.
ABUSE OF THE WRIT IN THE PRESENTATION OF NEW CLAIMS
A second aspect of the Sanders decision which has proved troublesome
concerns successive applications involving questions of fact or law not
raised in an earlier habeas application. The factors which permit a federal
district judge, within his discretion, to refuse to entertain successive
habeas applications alleging new grounds for relief are grounded in equit-
78. See Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HAwv. L. REv. 1038,
1124 (1970).
79. See note 75 supra.
80. 372 U.S. at 317.
81. See notes 62-63 supra & accompanying text.
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able considerations,82 even though the writ itself is considered a legal
remedy. 3
The Sanders Court very carefully framed the inquiry in this situation
in terms of potential for abuse of the writ.84 It was emphasized that the
mere existence of a prior application for habeas relief in which a claim
was not raised does not of itself justify a refusal to entertain a subsequent
application. 5 Consistent with this view, the burden of raising the question
of abuse of the remedy was placed upon the government."' In explaining
this procedural allocation, the Court noted that since most habeas ap-
plications are prepared without the aid of counsel, it would be unfair to
require the applicant to negative this issue in his pleadings . 7
Moving from procedural to substantive considerations, the Court stated
that an abuse of the writ may be found only where there has been a
"deliberate" withholding of a claim under circumstances amounting to
waiver.88 Such circumstances do not exist, however, if the claim was not
presented because of justifiable ignorance of certain facts or their legal
significance.89 In making such a determination, it would appear that in
many cases the district judge will have to hold an evidentiary hearing to
obtain information not present in the records or files of the case. More-
over, from a practical point of view, it may be impossible for a court to
determine whether a prisoner was justifiably ignorant of certain facts or
their legal significance.
Concerning what constitutes a waiver, the Sanders Court stated merely
that this determination should be made in accordance with the standards
announced in Fay v. Noia.90 Unfortunately, there are several factors
relevant to the question of whether a prisoner has abused the writ which
the Court considered in a perfunctory manner or not at all. For example,
although it was recognized that most habeas applications are prepared
without the assistance of counsel,9 more emphasis should have been
given to the role (or lack thereof) of counsel in the preparation of habeas
applications. Even those district courts which have attempted to simplify
82. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 17 (1963).
83. See R. SOKOL, FEDERAL HABEAS CoRPus 33 (2d ed. 1969).
84. 373 U.S. at 17-18.
85. Id. at 17.
86. Id. at 10-11, citing Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948).
87. 373 U.S. at 11.
88. Id. at 18. See note 23 supra & accompanying text.
89. 373 U.S. at 10.
90. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
91. 373 U.S. at 11.
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the pleading process through the use of forms92 or other devices designed
to elicit information from habeas applicants so that all claims for relief
are presented jointly 3 have not been effective in obviating the need for
counsel. Developing and presenting facts contained in the record and
elsewhere in a manner which fully identifies the nature and significance
of constitutional claims requires some understanding of the intricacies of
criminal procedure. The possibility that some claims for relief will not
be presented due to ignorance is inherent in the process when counsel
has not participated. It also seems inappropriate to place the district judge
in the position, suggested by the Sanders Court,9 4 of attempting to formu-
late the exact nature of legal claims contained in the often unorganized
allegations of the prisoner.
Another factor which the Court in Sanders failed to consider is the
motivation of a prisoner in seeking collateral relief. In cases where a
state court refuses on procedural grounds to entertain a prisoner's claim
for relief on the merits, Fay v. Noia establishes the right of the prisoner
to present his constitutional claims to a federal court, unless the court
determines that the petitioner "knowingly" or "deliberately" waived this
rightY It is submitted that such a "waiver" concept fails to take into ac-
count the fact that seldom, if ever, will a prisoner intentionally withhold
a constitutional claim in a habeas application. In Harris v. Brewer,96
Judge Lay commented on the motivations of prisoners seeking to assert
constitutional claims:
It seems virtually inconceivable that a prisoner who seeks his liberty
will not allege every known basis which might support his release.
This is undoubtedly why so many frivolous grounds are alleged
in post-conviction petitions since the prisoner, unschooled in the
92. See Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1038,
1177 (1970). See also Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules Governing
Habeas Corpus Proceedings for the United States District Courts, Rule 9, reproduced
h 93 S. Ct. (Adv. Sh.) No. 16 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Rules].
93. In United States v. Lee, 446 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1971), the district court, by local
rule, had employed a procedure designed to put applicants on notice that all claims
for relief must be asserted jointly. Under the rule, applicants were warned that all
claims not submitted would be deemed "wilfully omitted," and, if presented at a later
time, they would not be "accepted or considered" by the court. Id. at 351 n.1. See also
Proposed Rules, supra note 92, Rule 9.
94. 373 U.S. at 22-23 (["The judge] is free to adopt any appropriate means for
inquiry into the legality of the prisoner's detention . ..
95. 372 U.S. at 438-39.
96. 434 F.2d 166 (Sth Cir. 1970).
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law, seeks his freedom on every ground he can imagine. It is in the
prisoner's self-interest to allege all constitutional infirmities, not
because of procedural forfeiture, but because of continued im-
prisonment. Judicial anathema will never surpass a prisoner's un-
ending quest for relief as an effective limitation on fragmented
consideration of his claims.97
It is most unfortunate that the Sanders Court found the standards of
waiver enunciated in Fay to be appropriate guiding principles in habeas
proceedings for determining when a prisoner has, by his own actions,
waived the right to assert his constitutional claims. Holding that a federal
district court may deny a writ of habeas corpus where there has been a
deliberate bypass of "the orderly procedure of the state courts," 11 the
Fay Court equated deliberate bypass with the familiar concept of waiver
of constitutional rights in other settings: "An intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right or privilege."9D9 The circumstances in
which waiver most often takes place in the context of state trial pro-
ceedings, however, bears little relation to the context of successive habeas
applications alleging new grounds for relief.
In the context in which it was considered in Fay, waiver often in-
volves questions of trial strategy designed to secure some anticipated
benefit'00 and in which counsel has participated.' As noted in Fay, the
abuse of state procedures also is a significant factor which the federal
habeas judge must take into account in determining the question of
waiver.1 2 These considerations, however, simply are not relevant in the
context of successive federal habeas proceedings. Since in most cases the
prisoner does not have the aid of counsel in deciding to bring or preparing
the first habeas application, it cannot be maintained that counsel advised
him to withhold a claim which can be asserted in a subsequent applica-
tion. The only "benefits" which a prisoner might possibly gain from
fragmenting his claim are in hedging against the possibility that his first
97. Id. at 169.
98. 372 U.S. at 438.
99. Id. at 439. This concept of waiver was first set forth in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
100. See White, Federal Habeas Corpus: The Impact of the Failure to Assert a Con-
stitutional Claim at Trial, 58 VA. L. REv. 67 (1972).
101. Cf. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965). In this case involving the right
to raise a claim on direct review, the Court held that the decision of counsel to waive
his client's rights could be binding even though the attorney did not first consult with
his client.
102. 372 U.S. at 439.
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attempt may come before an unsympathetic federal judge or in gaining
psychological satisfaction from a belief that his numerous complaints
are disrupting the administration of justice.1 3 The rationale for the first
possibility breaks down if it is accepted, as Judge Lay has noted,1 4 that
above all else, the prisoner wants his freedom as quickly as possible. With
respect to the possibility that the process may be used by vindictive
prisoners to harass the system, successive applications which can be found
on the basis of records and files of the case to be patently frivolous in
nature or clearly without merit may be summarily dismissed without
the expenditure of significant judicial resources.0 6
The result is that application of the concept of waiver to successive
federal habeas corpus applications serves no substantial interest except
judicial economy, a value which, it is submitted, is insignificant in com-
parison to the interests of an individual who possibly is being detained
unlawfully. The motivations for waiver by a prisoner are simply non-
existent. Moreover, even when the habeas applicant has been represented
by counsel and advised not to present a claim in the first habeas applica-
tion, no substantial federal interest is served by refusing to entertain a
subsequent application. The factors which would motivate counsel in
habeas proceedings not to raise a particular constitutional claim are based
entirely on his opinion concerning the merits of the claim. 06 Unlike the
situation in a case at trial, no possible benefit, from the point of view of
the prisoner, is to be derived from failing to raise a constitutional issue.
Thus, assuming that the claim does in fact raise an issue justifying a hear-
ing on the merits, it is inconsistent with the fundamental philosophy of
habeas corpus to hold the prisoner to a waiver. In short, questions con-
cerning the proper allocation of decisionmaking between counsel and
client should not be considered in habeas proceedings when the issue
simply involves the decision to assert a claim for relief. 0 7
103. It also has been suggested that many applications for relief are filed to obtain
a short release from prison to testify. See Developmentr in the Law-Federal Habeas
Corpus, 83 HARv. L. Rnv. 1038, 1154 (1970). This factor is of dubious validity in the
case of federal prisoners, since a federal district judge, even after ordering an evi-
dentiary hearing, is not required to bring the prisoner before the court. 28 US.C.
§ 2255 (1970). The procedure for state prisoners, however, does require the court,
when ordering an evidentiary hearing on questions of fact, to issue an order that the
prisoner be brought to court. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1970).
104. See text accompanying note 97 supra.
105. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
106. Cf. McCartney v. United States, 343 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1965). But see Murch
v. Mottram. 409 U.S. 41 (1972) (per curiam).
107. Professor White argues that courts should decide which party is most likely
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The question of waiver of the right to assert an additional constitu-
tional claim in successive habeas applications involves considerations
wholly different from those involved when the issue on the successive
application is whether the failure to present relevant evidence on the
particular claim was due to inexcusable neglect. When the question is
the right to relitigate an issue previously determined adversely to the ap-
plicant based upon "new" evidence within the meaning of To'wnsend v.
Sain, holding the applicant to a waiver of his right to present such addi-
tional evidence because of inexcusable neglect is consistent with the
fundamental nature and purpose of the writ. Once the legal grounds for
relief have been formulated, if questions of fact are involved, counsel
normally is appointed to represent the applicant. Since the prisoner's
counsel must then make strategic decisions concerning the presentation
of evidence, he acts in essentially the same capacity as a trial attorney.
There is thus ample justification to view the question of waiver of the
right to present additional evidence on questions previously determined
in habeas proceedings in the same manner that the question of waiver
would be considered in an initial habeas proceeding. As Professor Bator
has pointed out with respect to the propriety of even an initial federal
evidentiary hearing, consideration must be given to the fruitlessness of
a search for "ultimate truth." 10
Although there is a possibility that the writ may be abused if a prisoner
is not limited in his right to present "new" or "different" evidence to
support previously litigated claims, this is not the case with the assertion
of new constitutional claims for relief. Even assuming that a prisoner is
capable of continually raising wholly new claims for relief, the ability of
a federal district judge to identify from the files and records of the case
the frivolous nature of any claim should be an adequate check on possible
abuse of the system. 0 9
to render an intelligent decision and then allocate as between the defendant and his
attorney the responsibility of deciding whether to assert a claim at trial. White, Fed-
eral Habeas Corpus: The Impact of the Failure to Assert a Constitutional Claim at
Trial, 58 VA. L. REV. 67, 98 (1972). When the question relates to the ends to be
achieved rather than the means to those ends, the defendant's judgment should be
required, and waiver in such case should be made in open court after the judge has
explained the consequences. Id. at 74-76. A similar approach to waiver in the case
of successive habeas applications could be employed.
108. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,
76 H~Av, L. REv. 441, 451 (1963).
10,9. The Judicial Conference of the United States has submitted a preliminary draft
of proposed rules governing habeas corpus and section 2255 proceedings in the dis-
trict courts. Proposed Rules, supra note 92. Proposed Rule 9(b), for each type of
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CONCLUSION
The question of the propriety of permitting prisoners to file successive
applications for federal habeas relief is only one of the many problems
not adequately resolved by the current system of federal habeas corpus.
Since, however, the whole scope of criticism of the existing system can
be used to support curtailment of the right to file successive habeas ap-
plications, the practice may be the most vulnerable to attempts to change
the system. Nevertheless, arguments that concepts of fairness are satisfied
when there has been one opportunity to present constitutional claims in
a federal forum or that the judiciary cannot withstand the strain of suc-
cessive habeas applications from the same prisoner ignore the fundamental
purpose of the writ to guarantee a prisoner a full and fair hearing on all
constitutional claims.
To maintain the vitality of the writ, the Supreme Court should re-
emphasize that the controlling focus of inquiry when a successive ap-
plication involves an issue previously determined on the merits is whether
a full and fair hearing has been afforded in accordance with the standards
of Townsend v. Sain. In addition, in developing new guidelines with
respect to successive applications involving grounds for relief not previ-
ously determined, the Court should consider the prevailing practice of
uncounseled preparation of habeas applications, the motivation of those
seeldng habeas relief, and principles of fairness distinguishing waiver in
the context of successive habeas applications from waiver of state pro-
cedural rules.
proceeding, addresses the problem of successive applications for relief and permits dis-
missal of second or successive petitions when no new ground for relief is alleged or,
if new or different grounds are alleged, when the court finds that the failure previously
to assert such grounds was "not excusable." Even though the Advisory Committee
Notes indicate that the proposed rules are not intended to change existing standards,
the propriety of introducing language different from that used in Sanders and in sec-
tion 2244(b) should be seriously questioned.
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